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Now Daddy’s Changing Diapers and Mommy’s Making Her Career: 
Evaluating a Generous Parental Leave Regulation 
Using a Natural Experiment
* 
 
Over the last decades many OECD countries introduced parental leave regulations in order 
to counteract low and decreasing birth rates. In general, these regulations aim at making 
parenthood more attractive and more compatible with a working career, especially for 
women. The recent German Elterngeld reform is one example: By replacing 67 per cent of 
prepartum parental labor earnings for up to 14 months after birth of the child – if both father 
and mother take up the transfer – it intends to i) smooth or prevent households' earnings 
decline postpartum, ii) make childbearing attractive for working women while iii) keeping them 
close to the labor market, and iv) incentivize fathers to participate in childcare. We evaluate 
the reform by using a natural experiment created by the quick legislative process of the 
Elterngeld reform: Comparing outcomes of parents with children born shortly after and before 
the coming into effect of the law on 1 January 2007 yields unbiased estimates of the reform 
effects, because at the time when these children were conceived none of the parents knew 
that the regulation would be in force by the time their child is born. Our results are based on 
unique data from the official evaluation of the reform, which we conducted for the German 
government, and they show that the reform has been generally successful in attaining its 
objectives. In particular, we find a significant decrease in mothers' employment probability 
during the 12 months after giving birth, and a significant increase in mothers' employment 
probability after the Elterngeld transfer expires. 
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1. Introduction 
Most OECD countries have been facing low and decreasing birth rates for the last decades. To 
counteract this trend towards an ever aging and shrinking population, several countries 
introduced parental leave regulations that intend to make parenthood more attractive and more 
compatible with a working career, especially for women. In general, the core element of such 
regulations is a transitory financial transfer to parents of newborn children. Some countries (e.g. 
Austria and France) offer flat rate transfers, other countries (e.g. Canada and Norway) offer 
parental leave transfers that depend on parents’ labor earnings in the period before the birth of the 
child, thus incorporating the opportunity costs implied for parents who leave the labor force for 
some time to take care of their child. 
Germany took up such a system of parental leave benefit, the so-called Elterngeld, on 
January 1
st 2007, replacing a much less generous system called Erziehungsgeld. The new 
Elterngeld offers a 67 per cent replacement rate of previous labor earnings (from employment or 
self-employment) for either father or mother for up to 12 months postpartum. If both father and 
mother participate, they can receive an extra 2 months, and the resulting total leave of 14 months 
can be freely distributed between the two parents. Single parents can receive a total of 14 months 
alone. The transfer is truncated at a maximum of 1800 Euros per month, and a flat rate minimum 
of 300 Euros per month is paid to every parent who has no previous earnings.  
The regulation intends to achieve four objectives: First, prevent or smooth the earnings 
decline for working parents in the first year after birth. Second, increase incentives to re-enter the 
labor force once the benefit expires, by shifting the (potential) earnings decline from the time of 
delivery up to 12 months into the future. Third, make it more attractive for working fathers to 
stay home for some months and take care of the child. Fourth, make parenthood more attractive 
in particular for women with a working career, who receive a generous transfer reflecting the 
labor earnings they forfeit in order to become mothers and take care of the child after birth, and   4 
thus increase the birth rate.  
The take up rate of the Elterngeld transfer has been nearly 100 per cent. In this paper, we 
use a natural experiment created by the coming into effect of the Elterngeld law to estimate the 
causal effect of the new regulation on several outcomes reflecting its objectives. The law was put 
into effect in a rather quick legislative process: In fact, the Elterngeld regulation was decided by 
the government coalition only in May 2006, and parliament agreed in September 2006, 
generating the following natural experiment: At the point in time when those children born 
shortly after the date of coming into effect of the Elterngeld (January 1
st 2007) were conceived, 
none of the parents knew that by the time their child is born the new regulation would be in force. 
That is, by comparing the labor market behavior and financial situation of parents with children 
born during the last months of 2006 with that of parents with children born during the first 
months of 2007, we obtain unbiased estimates of the reform effects. 
Our empirical analysis uses unique data from a survey that specifically covers these two 
groups of parents. The data were collected as part of the official evaluation of the reform, which 
we conducted for the German government (RWI 2008). The empirical results indicate that the 
reform was effective: Parental households with Elterngeld experience a stabilization of their 
household income, and the probability of receiving other social transfers is reduced, especially 
among highly educated women. Moreover, mothers are significantly more likely to stay outside 
the labor force and take care of their child during the first 12 months. This increase in probability 
is particularly high for mothers who have their first child. At the same time, Elterngeld mothers 
are significantly more likely to re-enter the labor force or take up work 1.5 years after birth of the 
child. Taking also into consideration an increasing take-up rate of fathers, the Elterngeld reform 
thus seems to have fundamentally changed the situation and labor market behavior of young 
parents in Germany. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the rationale for implementing   5 
parental leave benefits and gives details on the German Elterngeld reform. In section 3 we discuss 
the design of the natural experiment and the data. Section 4 presents estimates of the reform 
effects, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Parental leave regulations in Germany 
a. The rationale for reform 
In comparison to other OECD countries Germany has been characterized by relatively generous 
parental leave regulations, especially with regard to job-protection periods. Starting in 1979 job-
protected leave was set at 6 months after birth und continuously extended to up to 36 months 
after birth from 1992 on. Job-protection regulations bar employers from dismissing parents 
during that time, and safeguard the option to return to the same job held before childbirth (or a 
similar one within the same firm). Since 2001 parents have also been entitled to claim a part-time 
contract.  
Besides job-protection, parents receive financial benefits while on leave. Until the end of 
2006, the benefit was paid up to a maximum of 24 months after birth and targeted at low-income 
families (see section 2b below). As a consequence of previous extensions in job-protection 
periods German mothers have been induced to delay their return to work (Schönberg and 
Ludsteck 2008) and have relatively long out-of-job periods following childbirth (e.g. Gustafsson, 
Wetzels, Vlasblom and Dex 1996, Michaud and Tatsiramos 2009, Geyer and Steiner 2007). Also, 
female employment rates are lower than in most other countries of Northern or Central Europe 
(Figure 1).   
 
< Figure 1 about here > 
 
In light of these developments along with the emerging and expected consequences of   6 
demographic change, like an ever increasing number of pensioners relative to the active working 
population, German policy makers started to think about measures on how to increase the number 
of individuals contributing to the social security system. Raising the share of working women is 
seen as one remedy, which might be achieved by changing work-family related incentives. In 
addition, proponents of the Elterngeld reform hope that by shortening out-of-job periods of 
women and thus lowering human capital depreciation while being away from work, the reform 
might also help reduce gender disparities. 
Another remedy alleviating the effects of demographic change in the long run would be to 
increase fertility rates. It has been well documented that these experienced a substantial decline in 
OECD countries over the last decades (e.g. Frejka and Sobotka 2008). In fact, fertility in Europe 
has seen a massive decrease from the high fertility rates of the 1950s and 1960s – generally in the 
range of 2.0 to 3.0 for all of Europe – to the low and very low fertility rates of the last two 
decades. During the time period 1970-1985 European fertility rates fell below the population 
replacement threshold of 2.1, since then bottoming out at very low rates of 1.2 to 1.4 in many 
countries, including Italy, Spain, Poland, Austria and Germany.
2 The German total fertility rate in 
2006 was a mere 1.32.  
While all European countries share the declining trend since the 1970s, large differences 
between countries exist. Notably, it is the Mediterranean countries Spain and Italy, the Central 
European countries Germany and Austria along with most countries from Eastern Europe that 
have very low fertility rates. In contrast, the Nordic countries Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and 
Finland have experienced relatively high and/or increasing fertility rates over the last decade. The 
Nordic states are joined within the high-fertility group by Ireland, France, and the Netherlands 
(Frejka and Sobotka 2008). These patterns have been discussed extensively in the literature: 
Adsera (2004) shows that the divergent trends within Europe can at least be partly explained by 
                                                 
2 Cf. Eurostat (2009) online database, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu    7 
differences in labor market institutions across countries, and the impact that these institutions 
have on reproductive behavior. For instance, relatively high unemployment and the prevalence of 
unstable contracts – both common to Southern European countries such as Spain and Italy – 
depress fertility, in particular for younger women. On the other hand, institutions such as a large 
share of public employment (which provides employment stability) and generous maternity leave 
benefits linked to previous employment – both features common to Scandinavian countries – 
boost fertility of women in the age group 25-34 years.  
Parental leave benefits are indeed intended to counteract the trend of a low and decreasing 
birth rate in a given country, by trying to make parenthood more attractive and more compatible 
with a working career, in particular for women. Generally, the core element of any parental leave 
regulation is a transitory financial transfer to parents of newborn children. The first option is to 
design this as a flat-rate regime, as is the case, for instance, in France and Austria. The alternative 
is to design the parental leave benefit as a transfer depending on parents' labor earnings 
prepartum, thus incorporating the opportunity costs associated with withdrawing from the labor 
force for a while in order to take care of the child. Such regimes exist, for instance, in Norway, 
Sweden, and Canada. Also the German Elterngeld regulation has the parental leave benefit 
depend on parental labor earnings prior to the birth of the child. 
 
b. The new Elterngeld regulation 
On 1 January 2007 a new parental leave benefit called Elterngeld ("parental money") replaced a 
previous benefit called Erziehungsgeld ("child-raising benefit"). Whereas the previous benefit 
was specifically targeted towards low-income families, the new Elterngeld is a much more 
generous transfer with, in principle, universal coverage. Most importantly, the Elterngeld transfer 
incorporates the opportunity costs of childbearing by depending on parental labor earnings in the 
prepartum period.    8 
  The Erziehungsgeld benefit in place until 31 December 2006 comprised two options: The 
first option was to receive 300 Euros per month for a period of up to 24 months, for mother or 
father. Alternatively, the second option was to receive 450 Euros per month for up to 12 months. 
The transfer was means tested and in order to be eligible the recipient was required to not be 
working full-time, i.e. less than 30 hours per week. 66 per cent of parents were covered by option 
1, 10 per cent by option 2, and 24 per cent of parents did not receive the benefit. 
Since 1 January 2007, the new Elterngeld replaces 67 per cent of previous labor earnings 
– i.e. with respect to the 12 months before birth of the child – for up to 12 months after birth of 
the child. If both father and mother take up the transfer, they can receive an additional 2 months, 
and the resulting total of 14 months can be freely distributed between the two parents. Single 
parents receive 14 months of Elterngeld transfer alone. The transfer is truncated at a maximum of 
1,800 Euros per month, and a flat rate minimum of 300 Euros per month is paid to every parent 
who has no or very low labor earnings prepartum. In order to be eligible, recipients are also 
required to not be working full-time. Since its coming into effect, the take-up rate of the 
Elterngeld transfer has been nearly 100 per cent.  
The Elterngeld reform has four main objectives. First, it intends to increase the birth rate 
in Germany by making parenthood more attractive for women with a working career. Second, it 
aims at preventing or smoothing the earnings decline for working parents in the period after birth 
of the child. Third, it intends to incentivize mothers to re-enter the labor market faster (after 
having taken care of the child during the first 12 months after birth). Fourth, it intends to 
incentivize fathers to take part in childcare.   
The regulation contains an evaluation mandate, i.e. the law required government to inform 
parliament about the reform effects by October 2008.
3 RWI won the corresponding "call for 
                                                 
3 The evaluation mandate is specified in § 25 of the Elterngeld law (see Bundesgesetzblatt 2006). The text (in 
German) along with further details on the Elterngeld regulation and the evaluation report can be found at 
http://www.bmfsfj.de/Politikbereiche/familie,did=76746.html    9 
tenders" and conducted the research project evaluating the reform for the Federal Ministry for 
Family, Seniors, Women, and Youths (BMFSFJ) during the time period July 2007 through 
October 2008. Part of the research presented in this paper originates in that project. Naturally, 
reform effects on the birth rate cannot be analyzed in such a short term. 
 
3. Research design and data 
To evaluate the reform effects, we make use of a natural experiment generated by the process of 
coming into effect of the Elterngeld law and compare parents giving birth during the last months 
of 2006 (the control group) with parents giving birth during the first months of 2007 (the 
treatment group receiving the Elterngeld benefit). Similar identification strategies comparing 
those giving birth shortly before a reform with those giving birth shortly after have been used for 
example by Schönberg and Ludsteck (2008), Lalive and Zweimüller (2009) and Ekberg, Eriksson 
and Friebel (2005). The identification strategy assumes that the month of birth has no impact on 
the behavior of parents, i.e. without the reform parents in both groups would have behaved 
similarly.  
In order to be valid the identification strategy requires that fertility in the treatment and 
control groups was not influenced by the reform and that mothers did not time births in response 
to the reform. In fact, the legislative process was rather quick: The government coalition – 
consisting of the conservative Christian Democratic Party CDU and the Social Democrats SPD – 
agreed on the main features of the regulation in May 2006 and published the draft law in June 
2006. Parliament then passed the Elterngeld law in September 2006, and the reform became 
effective on 1 January 2007. This timeline implies that at the point in time when those children 
born shortly after – and before – 1 January 2007 were conceived, none of the parents knew that 
by the time their child is born the new regulation would be in force.   
To investigate the validity of the design, Figures 2 and 3 give two measures of when and   10 
to what extent potential parents could have known about the reform. Figure 2 shows the 
frequency of reports on "Elterngeld" in major daily newspapers over time, while Figure 3 
displays the Google Search Volume Index relating the number of "Elterngeld" searches to the 
number of total searches originating in Germany. Both figures show that there is a pronounced 
peak in May 2006 around the time the government coalition agreed on the cornerstones of the 
reform. This is the first point in time when there was reason to conjecture that starting with 1 
January 2007 parents would receive a new type of parental leave benefit – but note that before the 
passing of the law in September 2006 this was not definite.  
 
< Figures 2, 3 about here > 
 
In principle there is a small probability that some of the parents in our treatment group 
self-selected into treatment, because once they learned about the possible coming into effect of 
the Elterngeld transfer in May 2006 they immediately decided to become parents (and otherwise 
would not have done so), and their child was then born before the end of March 2007. Given the 
fact, however, that the timing of conception cannot be completely controlled by parents, along 
with the fact that at the point in time at which parents would have had to act accordingly (May 
2006) there was no definite knowledge on whether the reform would indeed be implemented, we 
think that this is a rather hypothetical scenario. 
A potentially more severe caveat is that parents expected to give birth at the margin might 
have timed delivery accordingly to fall under either the old or the new regime. Tamm (2009) 
shows that a considerable share of mothers actually delayed deliveries. In particular, compared 
with the same time period in preceding years the number of births is significantly lower during 
the last three weeks of 2006 and significantly higher during the first week of 2007. These timing 
effects are highly selective, as they mostly occur among older women and women working before   11 
childbirth.   
Hence, comparing the outcomes of interest of parents with children born in the last quarter 
of 2006 (Q4/06) and parents with children born in the first quarter of 2007 (Q1/07) should yield 
unbiased estimates of the reform effects, if leaving out those parents giving birth very shortly 
before and very shortly after. Since our data contain month of birth but not the exact birthday, our 
analysis provides two sets of estimates: The first one compares outcomes of all parents giving 
birth during Q1/07 (the treatment group) and Q4/06 (the control group), while the second one 
restricts the comparison to those parents giving birth during February and March 2007 (restricted 
treatment group) with those giving birth during October and November 2006 (restricted control 
group).  
The data on treatment and control groups were collected as part of the evaluation project, 
following the design just described. Specifically, in May 2008 we conducted a written survey 
among parents with children born in Q1/07 and Q4/06. The survey was implemented in 
cooperation with two health insurance funds (AOK Rheinland, AOK Sachsen-Anhalt), in order to 
have a uniform data base for the addresses of treatment and control groups. The sample contains 
N=1,266 households, of which N=694 are in the treatment group with delivery in Q1/07, and 
N=572 in the control group with delivery in Q4/06. The restricted sample comprises a treatment 
group of N=434 households with delivery in February or March 2007, and N=388 control 
households with delivery in October or November. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for both full and restricted samples, along with t-tests 
on differences-in-means between treatment and control groups. If the natural experiment as 
described above is valid, then there should be few or no covariate differences between the two 
groups. Indeed, as Table 1 illustrates, treatment and control groups are balanced in core 
covariates for both samples, the only significant exceptions being a residual variable describing if 
fathers' educational attainment is "other or missing", a dummy variable describing if fathers were   12 
employed prior to the birth of the child, and a dummy variable for mothers' "low education" in 
the full sample. We would thus argue that the natural experiment is valid, but will nonetheless 
also present estimates of reform effects adjusting for covariates. 
 
< Table 1 about here > 
 
Note that our sample is not necessarily representative of the German population, as the 
population from which it was drawn is defined as members of the two above-mentioned health 
insurance funds in two federal states (Nordrhein-Westfalen and Sachsen-Anhalt). AOK members 
are on average older, and are more likely to have lower income, to have a larger number of 
children, and to not be self-employed. This, however, constitutes the group for which reform 
effects are particularly interesting, since they were already targeted by the pre-reform 
Erziehungsgeld regulation, and are thus the group not obviously benefiting from the reform. 
Moreover, our main interest does not lie in estimating the average treatment effect for the entire 
population, but rather in heterogeneous effects by subgroups. As the results in the following 
section show, average effects on a particular outcome may indeed by insignificant, while 
subgroup effects are not. Finally, our data do allow us to investigate differential effects of the 
reform in West and East Germany. 
 
4. Results 
Tables 2 through 6 present impact estimates of the Elterngeld reform on a set of outcomes. Given 
the natural experimental design, these impact estimates are simple differences-in-means between 
the treatment and control groups (panel a in each table). We focus the discussion on the 
comparison between February/March 2007 and October/November 2006 births in the restricted 
sample (columns to the right), but also provide estimates for Q1/07 and Q4/06 births as a   13 
sensitivity check (columns to the left). In addition the tables also report differences-in-means 
estimates controlling for background characteristics (panel b).  
Table 2 presents results for female employment rates, analyzing the reform effect on the 
timing and structure of mothers' return to the labor force. It indicates that there is indeed a 
substantial reform effect on mothers' employment participation. First, in panel a) we see that the 
strong incentive created by the reform to stay home during the first 12 months postpartum indeed 
results in a significantly lower employment rate of mothers in the treatment group at 10 months 
after birth of the child. Looking at subgroups, we find this effect to be particularly strong for 
women having their first child and for those who were previously employed – both have 
significantly and about 11-14 percentage points lower employment rates at 10 months after 
delivery. These results remain unchanged when controlling for background characteristics in the 
bottom panel b).   
Second, we see that mothers in the treatment group do not differ from the control group at 
exactly 12 months after delivery but then increasingly take up (or return to) work after the 
Elterngeld transfer expires (measured using the employment status 1.5 years after birth). Note 
that this refers to the expected employment status, as the interview took place less than 1.5 years 
after childbirth. Again looking at subgroups, this effect is mostly driven by women in East 
Germany and women who were not employed directly before birth. For the latter group, the 
Elterngeld seems to create an incentive to take up work after 1.5 years that under the old 
regulation apparently did not exist.  
The larger impact among East German women compared with West Germans might be 
linked with the availability of childcare facilities. The availability of places for children below 
age 3 is much better in the Eastern regions than in the West (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008, 
Muehler 2008). Third, at around two years after birth the difference between treatment and 
control group becomes insignificant and is close to zero. This indicates that there is a timing   14 
effect between the first and second year after delivery, but there is no long-run effect on 
participation rates.  
Figure 4 provides further evidence by showing employment rates separately by month of 
birth of the child. Most of the differences between adjacent months are small, except for the 
employment status 1.5 years after birth, which experiences a sharp increase between December 
and January births, and employment status 10 months after birth, which appears quite a bit lower 
for February/March 2007 than October/November 2006. This indicates that under the new 
regulation mothers are indeed more likely to return to work in the second year after giving birth, 
while at the same time also being more likely to take care of the child during the first year. 
 
< Table 2, Figure 4 about here > 
 
Next we discuss the impact of the reform on the financial situation during the first year 
after birth of the child. Tables 3 and 4 contain impact estimates on household income and receipt 
of social transfer payments, respectively. In the survey we asked parents for changes in monthly 
net household income experienced between the year before and the year after childbirth. Simple 
difference-in-means results presented in panel a) of Table 3 indicate that parents in the treatment 
group might have experienced income changes (mostly reductions) between the year before and 
the year after the birth of the child which do not differ from those of the control group. Yet the 
insignificant overall effect hides that some subgroups of parents in the treatment group actually 
do experience significant changes. In particular, looking at the restricted sample mothers 
employed before birth and highly educated mothers experience significantly smaller income 
reductions (i.e. the comparison with the control group results in positive coefficients in the table), 
while mothers not employed before birth seem to experience no significant change. These effects 
are slightly more pronounced when we control for background characteristics (panel b).   15 
Table 4 shows the reform effect on mothers' probability of receiving a social transfer, i.e. 
welfare payments like ALG II (long-term unemployment assistance) or Sozialhilfe (social 
assistance). The estimate of the overall effect shows that the Elterngeld reform reduced this 
probability by around 6 percentage points. This overall effect is significant at the 10% level. 
Results for subgroups indicate that the overall effect is mainly driven by a reduction in welfare 
receipt of women who have their first child and by women with higher educational attainment, 
i.e. those groups of women who on average had higher employment rates and higher earnings 
prior to birth.  
 
< Tables 3, 4 about here > 
 
 Finally we analyze the reform impact on fathers' behavior. RWI (2008) shows that in 
slightly more than 16 percent of households with newborn children the father receives Elterngeld. 
However, more than two thirds of these fathers receive the Elterngeld transfer for two months 
only. Given that this is a rather short period of time it does not come as a surprise that we do not 
find any significant effects on fathers' employment rates in the survey. The simple difference-in-
means estimates presented in Table 5 indicate that the Elterngeld might have led to lower 
employment rates of fathers during the first 2 years after birth of the child. These negative point 
estimates are insignificant, however, or even become positive (at the 10%-level for employment 
status at 1 year after birth) once we control for fathers employment status before childbirth. (As 
has been shown in Table 1 there are significant differences in paternal employment already 
visible prior to birth.)  
In addition to employment status the survey also asked respondents about the share that 
mother and father each allocate to overall childcare at home during the first year after birth. The 
sum of a mother's and father's share within a household had to add up to 100 per cent. We find   16 
that within the treatment group fathers receiving Elterngeld took over considerably larger shares 
of childcare than fathers without Elterngeld (45 compared with 22 per cent share of childcare). 
Results comparing mothers in the treatment group with mothers in the control group, however, 
show that the share of involvement of their partners in childcare is higher by 3 percentage points 
only (Table 6). This difference is insignificant. That is, most of the difference between fathers 
receiving Elterngeld and those who do not might be a selection effect and thus no causal effect of 
the reform. Having said this, note that our dependent variable is the share of childcare the father 
takes over, which together with the mother's share adds up to 100 per cent. The insignificance of 
the difference between treatment and control group might result from a situation where neither 
fathers nor mothers change behavior. But it might also result from a situation where fathers and 
mother both increase the time with the child proportionally. Given the reduced labor market 
participation of mothers during the first 12 months after birth, the latter might actually be the 
case. 
 
< Tables 5, 6 about here > 
 
5. Conclusion 
In line with many other OECD countries, Germany recently implemented a generous parental 
leave regulation in order to counteract a trend towards an ever lower number of births. Increasing 
fertility is intended to be achieved by making parenthood more attractive and more compatible 
with a working career, especially for mothers. To this end, the new Elterngeld benefit generally 
replaces 67 percent of prepartum labor earnings for up to 12 months after birth of the child, thus 
incorporating the opportunity costs of childbearing.  
The legislative process through which the Elterngeld reform came into effect took only 
few months, allowing us to assess reform effects by comparing outcomes of parents whose   17 
children were born shortly before and after the coming into force of the law, because at the time 
of conception parents did not know the reform would be effective by the time their child is born, 
and hence could not self-select into the treatment group. Using this natural experiment, we base 
our impact estimates on data specifically collected for this purpose.  
We find that the Elterngeld reform is at least partially successful in attaining its 
objectives. Most importantly, the reform successfully generates incentives for (working) women 
to reduce employment during the 12 months postpartum and take care of the child, while after the 
Elterngeld transfer expires employment activity is significantly increased, also for women who 
were not employed prior to giving birth. In accordance with findings for previous reforms of the 
parental leave system in Germany regarding job-protection (Schönberg and Ludsteck 2008) the 
Elterngeld reform does seem to have an impact on the timing of re-entry into the labor market, 
but has very little or no impact on (planned) long-run participation rates of women.  
In addition, results show that highly educated women experience smaller income losses 
during the first year after birth compared with prepartum income and have a lower probability of 
receiving welfare payments relative to the old regulation. Finally, fathers seem to be incentivized 
indeed to take advantage of parental leave benefits. Given that most men only take 2 months of 
Elterngeld, however, this is not (yet) reflected in significant changes in paternal employment 
rates or time devoted to childcare during the first 12 months after birth.  
 
   18 
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Figure 1. Female employment rates, 2006 
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2009), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu  
 
 








90  20 














2005m7 2006m1 2006m7 2007m1
d a t e
FAZ SZ
Münchner Abendzeitung Kölner Stadtanzeiger  21 
Figure 3. Google Search Volume Index: Number of "Elterngeld" searches relative to all searches 
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Figure 4. Female employment rates after birth 
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Table 1. Summary statistics: Balance of treatment and control groups  









  Full sample: Q4/06 vs. Q1/07 
Number of children  1.77  1.81  0.78  1266 
Parents cohabitate  0.85  0.88  1.19  1264 
Age of mother  30.10  30.20  0.29  1244 
Age of father  32.70  33.08  0.94  1072 
Low education mother  0.20  0.25  2.12  1266 
Medium education mother  0.43  0.39  -1.30  1266 
High education mother  0.17  0.16  -0.61  1266 
University graduate mother  0.09  0.10  0.87  1266 
Other education / missing mother  0.11  0.10  -0.90  1266 
Low education father  0.26  0.29  1.12  1096 
Medium education father  0.35  0.34  -0.36  1096 
High education father  0.09  0.13  1.72  1096 
University graduate father  0.10  0.12  0.78  1096 
Other education / missing father  0.19  0.13  -3.08  1096 
Foreign mother  0.23  0.22  -0.34  1249 
Employed prior to birth, mother  0.46  0.51  1.73  1219 
Employed prior to birth, father  0.73  0.65  -2.58  934 
West Germany  0.63  0.64  0.33  1266 
Net household income prior to birth  1773  1779  0.10  1035 
Transfer receipt mother  0.49  0.45  -1.53  1266 
Transfer receipt father  0.32  0.30  -0.59  1094 
  Restricted sample: Oct/Nov 06 vs. Feb/Mar 07 
Number of children  1.80  1.81  0.07  822 
Parents cohabitate  0.87  0.89  0.91  821 
Age of mother  30.31  29.84  -1.10  810 
Age of father  32.66  32.56  -0.19  705 
Low education mother  0.21  0.26  1.73  822 
Medium education mother  0.43  0.37  -1.60  822 
High education mother  0.16  0.15  -0.41  822 
University graduate mother  0.09  0.11  0.89  822 
Other education / missing mother  0.11  0.10  -0.21  822 
Low education father  0.28  0.28  -0.04  721 
Medium education father  0.34  0.36  0.53  721 
High education father  0.10  0.12  0.91  721 
University graduate father  0.09  0.11  0.88  721 
Other education / missing father  0.19  0.14  -2.12  721 
Foreign mother  0.21  0.22  0.47  811 
Employed prior to birth, mother  0.46  0.49  0.85  794 
Employed prior to birth, father  0.73  0.65  -2.14  621 
West Germany  0.64  0.62  -0.64  822 
Net household income prior to birth  1889  1754  -1.68  671 
Transfer receipt mother  0.48  0.44  -1.12  822 
Transfer receipt father  0.30  0.29  -0.36  720 
Notes: Significance levels are indicated in italics (10%-level) and boldface (5%-level). "Transfer receipt" refers to 
welfare payments and unemployment benefits. 
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Table 2. Estimates of reform effects: Mothers' employment participation  
  Q1 vs. Q4  Feb/Mar vs. Oct/Nov 
  Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat 
a) Simple difference-in-means estimates         
Mother employed 10 months after birth  -0.040  -1.66  -0.059  -2.06 
Mother employed 1 year after birth  0.028  0.99  0.030  0.87 
Mother employed 1.5 years after birth  0.063  2.1  0.054  1.47 
Mother employed 2 years after birth  -0.008  -0.27  -0.016  -0.41 
         
Subgroups         
Mother employed 10 months after birth         
    German citizen  -0.047  -1.7  -0.076  -2.31 
    Employed before birth  -0.085  -2.16  -0.105  -2.14 
    Primipara  -0.083  -2.39  -0.143  -3.31 
    West Germany  -0.059  -1.96  -0.084  -2.25 
Mother employed 1.5 years after birth         
    German citizen  0.075  2.19  0.069  1.64 
    East Germany  0.105  2.05  0.150  2.44 
    Not employed before birth  0.057  1.69  0.071  1.74 
         
b) Difference-in-means estimates controlling for 
background characteristics 
       
Mother employed 10 months after birth  -0.054  -2.43  -0.065  -2.38 
Mother employed 1 year after birth  0.010  0.37  0.022  0.69 
Mother employed 1.5 years after birth  0.047  1.74  0.048  1.43 
Mother employed 2 years after birth  -0.028  -1.05  -0.028  -0.85 
         
Subgroups         
Mother employed 10 months after birth         
    German citizen  -0.053  -2.05  -0.070  -2.22 
    Employed before birth  -0.102  -2.55  -0.118  -2.39 
    Primipara  -0.103  -3.03  -0.151  -3.63 
    West Germany  -0.081  -2.86  -0.094  -2.70 
Mother employed 1.5 years after birth         
    German citizen  0.068  2.16  0.073  1.90 
    East Germany  0.075  1.61  0.146  2.58 
    Not employed before birth  0.066  1.99  0.066  1.66 
         
Note: Employment status 1.5 years and 2 years after birth reflects expectations and plans, while employment 
status 10 month and 1 year after birth measures actual behavior. Background characteristics include indicators 
for West Germany, cohabitation, foreign citizenship, the number of children, mother's educational degree and 
her working status prior to birth. Significance levels are indicated in italics (10%-level) and boldface (5%-level). 
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Table 3. Estimates of reform effects: Household income 
  Q1 vs. Q4  Feb/Mar vs. Oct/Nov 
  Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat 
a) Simple difference-in-means estimates         
Change in net household income between the year before and 
the year after birth (Euros/month)  -35.21  -1.09  6.15  0.16 
         
Subgroups         
Change in net household income between the year before and 
the year after birth (Euros/month)         
   Mothers with low or medium education  -45.48  -1.22  -12.85  -0.28 
   Mothers with high or university education  53.38  0.77  105.20  1.37 
   Mothers not employed before birth  -108.30  -2.75  -64.90  -1.44 
   Mothers employed before birth  75.00  1.59  113.85  2.00 
         
b) Difference-in-means estimates controlling for 
background characteristics         
Change in net household income between the year before and 
the year after birth (Euros/month)  -16.02  -0.52  19.28  0.53 
         
Subgroups         
Change in net household income between the year before and 
the year after birth (Euros/month)         
   Mothers with low or medium education  -28.26  -0.78  -6.08  -0.13 
   Mothers with high or university education  114.63  1.74  150.88  2.13 
   Mothers not employed before birth  -102.75  -2.57  -56.41  -1.23 
   Mothers employed before birth  76.05  1.65  103.06  1.82 
         
Note: Background characteristics include indicators for West Germany, cohabitation, foreign citizenship, the 
number of children, mother's educational degree and her working status prior to birth. Significance levels are 
indicated in italics (10%-level) and boldface (5%-level). 
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Table 4. Estimates of reform effects: Probability of receiving social transfers 
  Q1 vs. Q4  Feb/Mar vs. Oct/Nov 
  Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat 
a) Simple difference-in-means estimates         
Receipt of social transfers postpartum, mother  -0.063  -2.28  -0.061  -1.80 
         
Subgroup         
Receipt of social transfers postpartum, mother         
   Primipara  -0.110  -2.83  -0.081  -1.67 
   With siblings  -0.018  -0.46  -0.041  -0.86 
   Mothers with low or medium education  -0.045  -1.27  -0.033  -0.76 
   Mothers with high or university education  -0.095  -2.05  -0.097  -1.72 
         
b) Difference-in-means estimates controlling for 
background characteristics         
Receipt of social transfers postpartum, mother  -0.021  -1.19  -0.036  -1.70 
         
Subgroups         
Receipt of social transfers postpartum, mother         
   Primipara  -0.047  -1.70  -0.058  -1.78 
   With siblings  0.001  0.05  -0.010  -0.38 
   Mothers with low or medium education  0.000  -0.02  -0.016  -0.60 
   Mothers with high or university education  -0.061  -1.94  -0.098  -2.70 
         
Note: Background characteristics include indicators for West Germany, cohabitation, foreign citizenship, the 
number of children, mother's educational degree, her working status prior to birth and the receipt of social 
transfers prior to birth. Significance levels are indicated in italics (10%-level) and boldface (5%-level). 
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Table 5. Estimates of reform effects: Fathers' employment participation  
  Q1 vs. Q4  Feb/Mar vs. Oct/Nov 
  Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat 
a) Simple difference-in-means estimates         
Father employed 10 months after birth  -0.055  -1.96  -0.049  -1.46 
Father employed 1 years after birth  -0.032  -1.19  -0.030  -0.90 
Father employed 1.5 years after birth  -0.037  -1.38  -0.021  -0.67 
Father employed 2 years after birth  -0.048  -1.84  -0.033  -1.08 
         
b) Difference-in-means estimates controlling for 
background characteristics         
Father employed 10 months after birth  0.006  0.46  0.015  0.85 
Father employed 1 years after birth  0.026  1.80  0.033  1.79 
Father employed 1.5 years after birth  0.009  0.47  0.028  1.11 
Father employed 2 years after birth  -0.002  -0.13  0.016  0.66 
         
Note: Background characteristics include indicators for West Germany, foreign citizenship, the number of 
children, father's educational degree and his working status prior to birth. Significance levels are indicated in 
italics (10%-level) and boldface (5%-level). 
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Table 6. Estimates of reform effects: Fathers' contribution to childcare  
  Q1 vs. Q4  Feb/Mar vs. Oct/Nov 
  Coefficient  t-stat  Coefficient  t-stat 
a) Simple difference-in-means estimates         
Share father contributes to childcare  2.78  1.84  2.88  1.54 
         
b) Difference-in-means estimates controlling 
for background characteristics 
       
Share father contributes to childcare  2.29  1.56  2.23  1.22 
         
Note: Background characteristics include indicators for West Germany, foreign citizenship, the number of 
children, father's educational degree and his working status prior to birth. Significance levels are indicated in 
italics (10%-level) and boldface (5%-level). 
 
 